Clarifying the Convoluted Eastern Congo

More than 120 different armed groups operate within the Democratic Republic of the Congo's (DRC) North and South Kivu provinces, as well as the Ituri province. These groups are the product of decades of instability in the DRC's resource-rich east and vary from criminal groups to rebels against the government, civil defense militias, and ethnic militias..From an outside perspective, the conflict in the eastern DRC is, understandably, very difficult to grasp..While still forming a part of the larger problem, a number of these groups are largely insignificant when it comes to examining which groups actually have an impact on the security situation. The number of armed groups can be narrowed down significantly to a much smaller list of groups which are significant players in the eastern DRC, and in determining its path forward..So, let's take a look at some of those groups..The March 23rd Movement:.The March 23rd Movement, more commonly known as the M23, or the M23 rebels, are the current primary driving force behind insecurity in the east. Out of the DRC's many armed groups, the M23 stand as the strongest, most well equipped, and the largest threat, holding large swathes of territory within North Kivu..The M23 was first founded in April of 2012. It was originally mostly comprised of former members of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), a former political militia that had operated in the eastern DRC. The group is primarily ethnically Tutsi..Following a peace deal with the government that was signed on March 23rd, 2009 (the namesake of the M23), the CNDP transformed into a political party and its troops integrated into the Congolese military..Rising tensions between the DRC's military and the former CNDP troops and growing pressure on the DRC to arrest the leader of the CNDP troops, General Bosco Ntaganda—who had a warrant placed against him by the International Criminal Court (ICC)—were key factors in prompting the formation of the M23 rebellion on April 4th, 2012..Further, the M23 also claimed they were living in poor conditions in the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) and that their rebellion was caused by the "obvious failure of the integration of elements of political-military movements into the Congolese armed forces" established in the March 23rd treaty..Following their rebellion, the M23 quickly saw military successes. By November, they were able to seize Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu. Following this seizure, 3,000 FARDC soldiers and Congolese policemen defected to join the ranks of the M23. Their rebellion briefly spread to South Kivu, and the M23 declared their intention to overthrow the government..Their hold on Goma was short-lived, however, as a primarily Ugandan-mediated ceasefire resulted in their withdrawal from the city on December 1st, returning to the positions they'd held prior to their seizure of the city..A subsequent peace deal created a temporary peace with a ceasefire in February 2013. During this time, Ntaganda turned himself in to the US Embassy in Rwanda, which handed him over to the ICC. The ceasefire was broken in May before being re-established and broken for good in July..Following this, a series of offensives from the FARDC and the UN's mission in the DRC, MONUSCO, were able to recapture significant amounts of land from the M23. This forced the M23's new leader, Bertrand Bisimwa, to accept a peace deal in which the M23 was to disarm and demobilize, thus ending their rebellion..The M23 experienced a large resurgence in 2022, after Bisimwa's forces, who had been residing in Uganda for several years, launched an offensive against the FARDC..Despite the establishment of several ceasefires and attempted peace deals since the M23's resurgence, combat between the M23 and the FARDC is still ongoing. Several foreign intervention forces, namely the East African Community (EAC) in 2023 and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) since the beginning of 2024 have proven inadequate to deal with the M23's insurgency..Presently, the M23 is threatening a number of key areas within North Kivu, after having already taken several..The M23 has continually accused the DRC government of taking genocidal action against the Tutsi and other civilian populations of North Kivu..Since its inception, and in the days of the CNDP, the M23 has been allegedly supported by both Uganda and Rwanda. Uganda has been accused of offering them limited amounts of financial and material support. Recent UN reports have stated that Uganda has continued their support of the M23, though it is, of course, limited in nature when compared to the Rwandan level of support..While Rwanda has been accused of much the same, providing financial and material support (primarily military equipment), Rwanda's support has gone above and beyond that of Uganda, with Rwanda having equipped the M23 with a number of modern weapon systems, including a Surface to Air Missile system that was discovered by the UN in February..Further, Rwanda has been accused of deploying soldiers to covertly fight alongside the M23, as well as to fulfill an advisory role. The UN estimates that Rwanda deployed as many as 1,000 soldiers when the M23 launched their offensive in 2022..Outside assessments of the M23 have noted that they are unusually well equipped and unusually well disciplined in combat settings for a rebel/militant group of their type. This is likely due to Rwanda's support of the group..Both Rwanda and Uganda have continuously denied supporting the M23..Throughout their insurgency, the M23 has come to be hostile to a number of the other groups that also operate in the east. Namely, the M23 has come to oppose the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Wazalendo, and the Mai Mai, in addition to the FARDC, the UN, and now the SADC. The group has also issued condemnations against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) attacks against civilians and promised a "relentless fight" against the ADF. However, it is unclear if any clashes have occurred between the two..A portion of the M23's funding, like many groups in the DRC, comes from smuggling resources out of mines. The DRC has claimed that the M23 smuggles resources to Rwanda, who then sells it on the open market..Several million people have been displaced as a result of the M23's insurgency, including several hundred thousand so far this year..Several foreign entities have accused the M23 of carrying out summary executions (and provides several notable examples of them), forcibly recruiting civilians into its ranks, and forcing civilians into manual labour, among other crimes. All three of these are war crimes under the Geneva Convention..The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda:.As the Rwandan Genocide was coming to a close, with the forces of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) steadily taking more and more land in the country from the hands of the genocidal regime, thousands upon thousands of refugees headed westward, for the nation of Zaire, the present day DRC. While some of those fleeing were civilians trying to escape the fighting, there were also a significant number of Interahamwe among them..The Interahamwe were the Rwandan Hutu militias that were the primary perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide against the Tutsi, the Twa, and moderate Hutu..A significant number of Interahamwe escaped into Zaire, and subsequently formed splinter militias that were hostile to the new Rwandan state under the RPF (though the Interahamwe itself does still exist, many of the splinter groups have taken further prominence). The existence of these groups was the catalyst for Rwanda's invasion of Zaire in 1996, beginning the First Congo War..The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) was formed in 2000, amidst the Second Congo War. In their founding, they were primarily comprised of former genocidaires and Interahamwe from the Rwandan Genocide, and was formed as an amalgamation of several of these groups..During this time, the FDLR received significant backing from and cooperation with the Congolese state, who used them as a proxy force against Rwandan forces. The FDLR launched attacks upon Tutsi militias and civilians within North and South Kivu, as well as across the Rwandan border against Rwandan troops. These attacks, which forced the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians, persisted after the end of the Second Congo War in 2002..This continued until March of 2005, when after talks with the Congolese government, the FDLR had promised to end their insurgency against Rwanda and instead return as a political party. Further talks led to the FDLR agreeing in August to leave the DRC by September 30th..However, within the talks Rwanda stated that any genocidaires which returned to Rwanda would face criminal prosecution for their involvement in the genocide. The FDLR subsequently refused to leave the DRC, unless they were granted political amnesty in Rwanda. Rwanda, of course, refused this..In January of 2007, Tutsi forces within the FARDC under General Laurent Nkunda began an offensive against the FDLR. While the offensive successfully pushed the FDLR out of a number of areas, it failed to fully eradicate the FDLR, and ended seven months later. This fighting displaced approximately 160,000 people..The end of this offensive was subject to significant condemnation from Rwanda, who stated it showed the DRC did not have the will to end the problem. Rwanda further added that it had offered to coordinate in operations with the DRC against the FDLR on several occasions, but had been refused..Rwanda's wishes were granted in 2009, when they deployed to the DRC in order to fight alongside the FARDC against the FDLR. While the operations were able to weaken the FDLR, they again failed to completely dismantle the group..Since their creation in 2000, the FDLR has launched a significant number of attacks against civilians in North and South Kivu. In a number of these attacks, the FDLR has been accused of perpetrating sexual violence, including against minors. Further, the FDLR has also been accused of recruiting minors into its ranks, and of abductions of civilians..Despite the FDLR and the FARDC having previously fought against each other, UN and Human Rights Watch reports have claimed that the FDLR and the FARDC have been cooperating with each other in order to fight against the M23 since the M23's 2022 offensive. The DRC has denied these accusations..Given the M23 is a majority Tutsi group, they have been at odds with the FDLR since the M23 was founded in 2012. They have regularly clashed since 2022. The M23 has successfully pushed the FDLR out of a number of areas within North Kivu, however the FDLR still maintains significant influence..Presently, the FDLR is the largest foreign armed group that operates within the DRC. While Congolese members are increasingly bolstering its ranks, its primary basis is still foreign born, Rwandan Hutu. It is also one of the last remaining Rwandan rebel groups, and is the most prominent of such..A number of prominent leaders within the FDLR have been arrested and tried for an array of war crimes, including in the ICC..The FDLR have been responsible for hundreds of civilian deaths since their creation in 2000..Additionally, the FDLR has been accused of killing Italy's Ambassador to the DRC, Luca Attanasio, in 2021..Wazalendo:.The Wazalendo, or the Voluntary Combatants for the Defence of the Homeland, are meant to be a civil defense militia. They were formed in May of 2023 after President Felix Tshisekedi called for "vigilance groups against the expansionist ambitions" of the M23 in November 2022..Primarily fighting against the M23, the Wazalendo operate in direct cooperation with the DRC's military, sometimes even wearing the uniform..However, the Wazalendo has now become a source of insecurity amongst some of the populations they are supposed to be defending. In particular, the Wazalendo have participated in mining operations in some of North Kivu's mines, smuggling the resources out of the country for money, as well as participating in attacks against civilians, specifically against Congolese Tutsi. The Wazalendo also operates in a coalition with the FDLR, alongside the FARDC, according to UN reports..The M23 has clashed with the Wazalendo for control of several of these mines, including recently at the beginning of May, when the M23 pushed the Wazalendo out of the key mining town of Rubaya. Rubaya has large deposits of coltan, a mineral important for making smartphones, laptops, and game consoles..The Wazalendo's actions have prompted the government to ban them from carrying weapons when they are within Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu, though they continue to cooperate with one another. The Wazalendo operate primarily around Goma but have fought against the M23 throughout North Kivu..Mai Mai:.Unlike the M23 or the FDLR, the Mai Mai are not one concrete group. Rather, the term is used to refer to community-based militias across the DRC, though they are primarily active within the North and South Kivu provinces. Given the variance of the groups, there is no concrete date for their founding. However, many of the first were founded in response to the Rwandan invasion of Zaire and later for protection against Rwandan-supported rebels within the Congo..A number of Mai Mai groups have also transitioned into or were founded as criminal groups that sought to capitalize upon the security situation within the eastern DRC. Some of the groups, headed by warlords, grew to be particularly powerful, especially as they came to control vital mining sites..Further, with the variance of the groups, many Mai Mai have aligned themselves with or against the government in different circumstances. In recent times, a number of Mai Mai groups have been aligned with the government. The M23 has accused the Mai Mai (not in reference to any particular group) of participating in a coalition headed by the FARDC..Given its community basis, many Mai Mai groups have been formed on ethnic lines..Since their creation, the UN and the government of the DRC have led a disarmament campaign that saw mixed successes. Several Mai Mai groups remain today, but they do not hold the influence and power they once had..A number of individual Mai Mai groups have been accused of carrying out attacks against civilians. One Mai Mai leader, Colonel Mayele, was arrested by the UN after being accused of being behind mass rapes in North Kivu..Mai Mai groups are also believed to have been behind a number of attacks against park rangers in the DRC's Virunga National Park..CODECO:.Within Ituri Province, the Cooperative for the Development of the Congo, or CODECO, is one of the primary causes of insecurity..CODECO was founded in the 1970s as an agricultural cooperative of the Lendu people in what was then Zaire. The group was formed to promote agriculture in Ituri, but also in order to act as a mouthpiece for the demands of the Lendu against the Hema people, as well as to speak against what they said was foreign exploitation of Congolese natural resources..The Hema were favored more than the Lendu under the Belgian colonial administration, a policy which was continued by Zairean dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. The Lendu and the Hema also face key differences in practices, with the Lendu being more agriculturalist, and the Hema being more pastoralist..The outbreak of the 1999-2003 Ituri conflict saw the group transform from an agricultural collective into a loose association of Lendu militias. The conflict ended in 2003, which in turn ended violence between the Lendu groups and the Hema groups, and CODECO's presence declined. Despite the decline, however, the group did not fully disarm, and several of the militias began stockpiling weapons..In 2017, CODECO, under the leadership of Justin Ngudjolo, began attacks in the Djugu district. Attacks witnessed a sharp increase in 2019, which prompted the UN to accuse Lendu groups, not specifically naming CODECO, of carrying out massacres against Hema civilians. Within the same year, shortly after an attack attributed to CODECO, the newly elected President Felix Tshisekedi vowed to "eliminate" the group..Fighting escalated in 2020, with the UN accusing CODECO directly of massacres "akin to crimes against humanity." Though the attacks from CODECO coincided with an increase in attacks by Islamic militant groups, they were not coordinating with each other. A ceasefire was signed in August 2020 between CODECO and the government, which was broken by October of that same year..Since resuming attacks in 2017, CODECO has killed thousands of people..CODECO oftentimes targets natural resource sites, such as gold mines. Hema groups also remain one of its primary targets. CODECO remains based in the Ituri province..The resumption of violence within Ituri is largely blamed upon CODECO's resurgence in 2017. Since then CODECO has been one of the deadliest groups within the DRC for civilians..Escalations between CODECO, rival groups, and the Allied Democratic Forces have resulted in MONUSCO substantially increasing its troop presence in Ituri in recent months..CODECO operates in direct opposition to the FPAC-Zaire, a Hema militia..FPAC-Zaire:.There is minimal information regarding FPAC-Zaire, oftentimes just referred to as Zaire, particularly surrounding their founding. The group is known to have formed within the last few years, as a direct response to CODECO's attacks upon Hema communities..Since their founding, Zaire has perpetrated a number of attacks upon Lendu civilians. Many of these attacks, which witness killings and kidnappings, are reprisal attacks that take place following similar actions by CODECO. Zaire and CODECO forces regular clash within Ituri..Zaire has proven to be largely resistant to any peace process attempts, having refused to attend several different peace initiatives..The areas in which Zaire operates are home to a number of gold mines, making their territory very strategic. CODECO and Zaire often fight over mines such as these, as it represents a significant source of income for whoever holds them..The UN has reported that Zaire sources its arms and equipment through trafficking networks through Uganda and Rwanda. Zaire has an expanded relationship with Uganda, with the UN stating Zaire has sent hundreds of its fighters to Uganda in order to receive training..Also particularly notable is the UN's observation of a connection between Zaire and the M23. The UN stated that several of Zaire's leaders hold connections with some of the M23's leaders, and have sent fighters to receive training from the M23 in the past. For example between May and June of 2023, the UN reported that Zaire sent 50 fighters to North Kivu in order to receive training from the M23..This is despite the M23 and Zaire holding no official allegiance toward each other..The Allied Democratic Forces:.Alongside CODECO, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) are one of the primary driving forces behind insecurity in Ituri..However unlike CODECO, the ADF is not restricted to Ituri. Nor are they Congolese in origin..The ADF was founded in Uganda, a neighbour of the DRC, in 1995 as a combination of several Ugandan rebel groups and Islamic organizations. The group quickly received training and logistical support from Sudan, who at the time was under Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir..Opposed to the government of President Yoweri Museveni, the ADF began launching attacks throughout Uganda, including in Kampala, the Ugandan capital..These attacks continued for several years, and were met with crackdowns by Uganda's military. Amidst the war between Uganda and the ADF, the ADF had begun to use North Kivu as a basing ground in order to carry out attacks against Uganda, as well as for recruitment..Within the wider context of the First Congo War, in which Uganda was one of many nations invading Zaire/DRC, the Zairean government offered support to the ADF as well, using them as a proxy against Ugandan forces. While fighting against the ADF in Uganda, Uganda's forces also carried out operations against the ADF within the DRC while their forces were engaged in the First and Second Congo Wars..After a multi-year campaign against the ADF, Uganda forced them out of the nation while maintaining a troop presence within the DRC to continue operations against the ADF and other anti-Ugandan government insurgent groups within the area. Uganda has since intervened against the ADF on numerous occasions and cooperated with the DRC to attack the ADF several times..Subsequent joint operations between Uganda and the DRC significantly weakened the ADF. From 2003 to 2012, the ADF only launched infrequent attacks against civilians and military forces..In 2013, the ADF experienced a brief resurgence, carrying out a series of large attacks against Congolese military forces, and moved to seize a number of towns, attacking civilians as well. The resumption of the ADF's insurgency prompted tens of thousands of civilians to flee the area, including over 60,000 who fled across the border to Uganda..The following year was full of military operations against the ADF. These operations once again weakened the ADF..The increasingly weakened position of the ADF prompted the flight of its leader, Jamil Mukulu, to Tanzania, where Mukulu was arrested by Tanzanian authorities and later extradited to Uganda..In Mukulu's place, Musa Baluku came to lead the ADF. Mukulu moved to cement a slow inclination towards Islamic radicalism and jihadism that had been rising within the ADF. The move towards radical Islamism drastically quickened under Baluku..The turn to jihadism was cemented in 2017 when Baluku swore allegiance to the Islamic State. This declaration caused a small split within the ADF's ranks, when approximately 10-30 fighters that were still loyal to Mukulu split from Baluku's faction. Baluku maintained the majority of the ADF's membership, and remains the primary faction..Since the ADF's turn to jihadism, while continuing attacks against Congolese military forces, they have oriented their attacks against civilians against Christian populations and other non-Muslims..In 2020, Baluku had stated that the ADF had ceased to exist, and had been fully integrated into the Islamic State's network as the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP). The ADF is the dominant force within ISCAP..The ADF again experienced a resurgence in 2021, when they launched a series of attacks not only against military forces and civilians in the DRC but in Uganda as well. Ranging from June 1st to November 16th, the ADF, with the assistance of the wider Islamic State network, carried out a series of attacks throughout Uganda, several of which were bombings..The attacks killed 11 people, four of which were perpetrators of the attacks, and injured an additional 39..In response to these attacks, Uganda launched Operation Shujaa. The operation once again saw Uganda's deployment to the DRC in order to fight alongside the FARDC against the ADF and any other Islamic State aligned militants in the area..Operation Shujaa has obtained mixed success. Despite claims from President Museveni and the DRC that the operation has been highly successful and killed scores of ADF militants, doubts have been raised as to whether the operation has actually had any large effect on the strength of the ADF. However, the operation has succeeded in either killing or arresting a number of senior leaders within the ADF, and has dislodged them from a few key areas..The ADF has continued to carry out attacks while Operation Shujaa has been going on. Some of the most prominent attacks took place in 2023. On the 16th of June, the ADF attacked a school within the Ugandan town of Mpondwe, killing 42 people, 38 of which were students..Soon after, on the 10th of August, the ADF launched an attack upon a prison in the North Kivu town of Butembo, successfully freeing 800 inmates from the prison, though approximately 250 of the inmates were soon recaptured..Some of the most prominent attacks have taken place more recently. More than 40 people were killed near to the North Kivu town of Beni on June 7th. ISCAP claimed responsibility for the attack, which was perpetrated by the ADF. This attack was soon followed by another attack from the ADF that killed 42 civilians on June 13th..Violence in Ituri and North Kivu has escalated recently, largely at the hands of the ADF and CODECO. Over 150 civilians were killed in the eastern DRC in June, the overwhelming majority of which was at the hands of the ADF..The ADF operates primarily in Ituri and North Kivu..Uganda and MONUSCO have accused the ADF of also holding links to Al-Qaeda, and Somalia's Al-Shabaab, however these claims have not been proven and doubts have been raised as to their legitimacy..The ADF has been regarded as a terrorist organization by several nations, including the US, who recognized them as a terror organization in 2021..Similar to other armed groups within the region, the ADF has benefited extensively from resource mines that are under its control..Mounting attacks from the ADF against civilians have caused the M23 to vow to "deal with" the ADF, and to carry out a "relentless fight" against them. The M23 issued this declaration in early July, 2024, however it is unclear if any clashes between the two groups have taken place..Instability in the East.The instability within the eastern DRC is not a new issue. It has been ongoing for 30 years, witnessed several foreign interventions, and displaced millions..This instability is one of the primary factors that makes the DRC one of the world's poorest nations, despite the extensive mineral wealth that lies underneath their territory..President Felix Tshisekedi has promised to end this insecurity. It was one of the key promises he was elected upon first in 2019, and again at the end of December. This task has proven difficult, however, with the instability in the east only worsening..The situation is, of course, highly complex. However, key to understanding such an issue, is understanding the forces behind it.