How to Make U.S. Airborne ISR More Survivable in A South China Sea Fight
On July 22nd, 2019, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) released the National Defense in the New Era White Paper which, for the first time, outlined the strategic implications of competition with the United States. An entire section of this paper was dedicated to the South China Sea where the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Air Force (PLAAF), and Army (PLA) have been hardening several dozen natural and artificially made islands with long range standoff missiles and aircraft. The militarization of these outposts has been ongoing since at least 2010. These operations are aimed at ensuring Chinese dominance in the First Island Chain, which Chinese planners consider to stretch from the South China Sea to the Japanese Coast. In response, the United States has deployed dozens of U.S. Navy vessels and aircraft from across the services to the South China Sea. However, the PLAN, PLAAF, and PLA have deployed several Beyond-Visual-Range (BVR) weapons that create Missile Engagement Zones (MEZ) and Weapons Engagement Zones (WEZ) hundreds of nautical miles in circumference, putting U.S. airborne ISR assets at significantly more risk. Within the U.S. military, planners are split on how to approach this problem set, with each service jockeying for increased funding to pursue its own solution. This challenge prompts the question: "How can the U.S. create a more survivable airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) profile in the South China Sea?"