Beyond the Ceasefire: Exploring the Future of Gaza and the West Bank

*Written in cooperation by Alexandre Reza and Sebastien GrayIt has now been ten months since Hamas and other Gazan factions launched their attack on Israel, killing 1,200 Israelis and kidnapping 250 hostages. This attack, which began the Israel-Hamas War, has claimed the lives of 40,000 Palestinians, according to the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry, of which 17,000 are Gaza militants, according to Israel. One of the largest questions begged by the outbreak of the Israel-Gaza War on October 7th, 2023, has been what the future of Gaza, and the Palestinian territories themselves, will look like..The humanitarian crisis unfolding in Gaza has sparked international calls for de-escalation and Palestinian self-determination. While many support the push for Palestinian sovereignty as a path toward justice and self-determination, the practical implications of what this looks like on the ground remain highly elusive. While desirable, the chance of such a state coming to fruition is being called into question by numerous different factors.In order to properly assess what the future can look like, it's necessary to look at the conflict holistically.Two Territories, Two PartiesFor nearly two decades, the Palestinian territories, Gaza and the West Bank have been separately governed by two different Palestinian parties. Gaza by Hamas, and the West Bank by Fatah through the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA).This division began in 2007, after a lengthy falling out between Hamas and Fatah that saw each expelled from the other's territory. The PA government, under President Mahmoud Abbas, was recognized as the legitimate international representative of the Palestinian people and maintained its partial autonomy granted to it by the Oslo Accords in the mid-1990s..Hamas went on to be internationally unrecognized; however, it remained dominant in Gaza as the largest and most powerful party therein. As such, they have built their own government that has governed the Gaza Strip since the 2007 Hamas-Fatah split.This has created two distinctly different situations in each of the Palestinian territories, which are under two distinctly different governments. The situation has, of course, been further complicated by the current war.The Gaza SituationThe outbreak of the war has brought Gaza to the forefront of thought when considering the future of Palestine and of a Palestinian state. While of course quite literally changing the landscape of Gaza, the war has also changed Gaza's political, militaristic, and societal landscapes.Hamas maintained political dominance in the Gaza Strip prior to the war. Except for occasional protests, their leadership had gone virtually uncontested since they took over the strip in 2007.The course of the war has seen this political hold slip. While Hamas is still the dominant political force in the region (excluding Israel), significant and key portions of their leadership and government have been assassinated or killed, their dominated territory has been drastically reduced, and global tolerance of their existence among the West has declined drastically.The West BankFor a while now, the West Bank has been governed by the partially-autonomous Palestinian Authority. As mentioned, the PA is under Fatah and President Mahmoud Abbas..The PA maintains diplomatic relations with the world, holding its own government and an array of consulates and embassies in Ramallah, its effective capital, as well as its own security forces.Though it has condemned Israel's conduct during the war, it has not been a participant in the war and has remained at peace with Israel despite moderate tension between the two.A deeper look at the situation in the West Bank, however, reveals that the PA has a very uneasy hold on its assumed territories. This grip has been eroded by several factors.Over time, Israel's hold on the West Bank has strengthened, simultaneously weakening the hold of the PA. This occurs through the continual establishment of settlements in the West Bank, and subsequent military checkpoints, that increase Israel's military presence in the West Bank as well as the Israeli settler population. This population reached 500,000 last year.The continual establishment of settlements all across the West Bank has resulted in the region being partially segregated. Further, the PA's actual areas of control have been reduced in size and largely disconnected from each other. Not only does this make the present situation difficult for the PA, but the border situation created by the settlements makes any formation of a Palestinian state wholly difficult, more so than it already had been by the geographical separation of Gaza and the West Bank.Besides Israel's growing control through settlements and checkpoints, the PA's hold has eroded over time by the simple fact that they aren't that popular.As a term of the Oslo Accords, the PLO issued a recognition of Israel. As a part of the formation of the PA and in line with this recognition, the PA has had to cooperate and collaborate with Israel. Anti-Israel sentiment is strong in the West Bank, and so the PA has been viewed as a collaborationist force. Some further view it as an extension of Israel's power in the strip due to their relationship and, at times, open assistance of Israel.This can particularly be seen through Israel's raids in the West Bank. When Israel seeks to launch a raid against militant forces in the West Bank in areas where PA security forces are present, these forces will withdraw, allow the IDF to carry out their operation, before moving back in after the IDF withdraws..This has drawn extensive condemnation from the West Bank's militant factions as well as the general populace. On numerous occasions, crowds have protested the return of PA forces following raids.Further eroding PA control has been the growing presence of these militant organizations. Over time several cities in the West Bank have become militant hotbeds, such as Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, and more. While PA security forces are oftentimes present in these cities, militant groups maintain effective control of several areas within these cities.All three of these cities are the site of frequent Israeli raids against these militant forces, during which intense clashes oftentimes occur. While these raids will largely produce arrests, they sometimes produce fatalities amongst the militant groups, and sometimes amongst civilians.While the PA does not participate in these raids, they do on occasion carry out arrests against Palestinian militants. These arrests have led to clashes between the PA and militant groups on several occasions..The PA's position is further weakened by the fact that it has not had an election since 2006. The lack of Palestinian elections produces an image of corruption by Abbas and Fatah. This has managed to keep Fatah in power and prevent the likely electoral victory of a more-extremist, less-collaborationist faction (as happened with Hamas' victory in the 2006 election), however has resulted in decreased legitimacy of the PA's government in the eyes of many.Their weak hold on the West Bank has called into question the PA's ability to hold administration over Gaza in its present state. Further, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated direct opposition to the PA assuming leadership in the strip, stating he will "not allow Hamastan to become Fatahstan.".The Question of Popular SovereigntyIf by popular sovereignty, a government "for the people, by the people," is implied, the available options are limited. Various scenarios for a post-war Palestine exist, but few envision the Palestinian population getting a say. The obstacles to popular sovereignty in this context are significant, stemming from both the fractured political landscape and the potential outcomes of any democratic process.The last democratic elections were held in the Palestinian territories in 2006, when Hamas won the majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council. Shortly after, Hamas expelled Fatah forces in Gaza, consolidating its control over the strip and ruling ever since. In contrast, the Palestinian Authority (PA), dominated by Fatah, has consolidated its power in the West Bank. Since then, no elections have been held in either territory. In the West Bank, the PA has faced widespread accusations of corruption and authoritarianism, with leaders remaining in power without renewed electoral mandates. This political landscape, marked by hostile relations between the two main political factions in the Palestinian territories, had two de facto states governing the people of Palestine.Aiming for a democracy in Palestine must take into account these tense internal dynamics. This is especially true as few organized political groups have enough influence or structure to participate in a meaningful democratic process beyond Hamas and Fatah. Furthermore, the question of who would administer the elections remains a significant challenge. With deep distrust between the factions, both entities clinging to power and an unlikely chance that a trusted foreign actor emerges, there is little consensus on a neutral body capable of overseeing a fair election process..Scenarios for the Future of Palestine:Scenario One: Hamas Back In PowerIf an administrative body were to be found, all likely scenarios point to a Hamas-run Palestine – a non-starter for Israel and other actors. Indeed, recent polling data highlights a concerning trend for those hoping that a democratic process in Palestine would lead to a unified and stable state. According to a survey by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), support for Hamas has grown significantly across both Gaza and the West Bank. Currently, Hamas enjoys 40 percent support overall, a notable increase from previous months, while Fatah, led by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, has seen its support stagnate at around 20 percent. The situation is even more striking in the West Bank, where support for Hamas has risen to 41 percent, compared to Fatah’s 17 percent. In Gaza, Hamas remains the dominant force with 38 percent backing, while Fatah trails at 24 percent. Alongside this shift, there is growing support for armed resistance, with 54 percent of Palestinians now favoring it as the primary means to achieve statehood, dwarfing the percentage that supports negotiations or nonviolent resistance. These numbers suggest that in any democratic election, Hamas would likely emerge as the dominant power, a scenario that would hinder rather than advance prospects for a Palestinian state.Hamas’ hardline stance and reliance on armed struggle remain fundamentally at odds with the diplomatic pathways necessary for statehood, making popular sovereignty in this context a potential pathway to continued conflict and division. In any post-war setting where Hamas survives politically and maintains its dominance of the Gaza Strip, it will have an extremely difficult time maintaining the level of political control it had pre-war. Further still, it will be ill-equipped to handle the intense level of reconstruction that will need to occur in order to make Gaza liveable once again. This difficulty of governance is further worsened by the militaristic decimation that Hamas has experienced. Israel has claimed to have killed 17,000 Hamas militants over the course of the war; approximately half of Hamas' estimated pre-war membership. While the validity of this figure has been called into question, it is safe to say that still a significant number of militants have been killed in widespread fighting with Israel. Further, it is clear that the war will have significantly depleted Hamas' weapons stockpiles. While they have been able to maintain combat against Israel, their ability to do so when compared to the initial days of the war and of the Israeli ground invasion has decreased..Once again, this assumes Hamas survives the present war. The future of Hamas, and Gaza, is largely dependent upon the course of ceasefire negotiations. Through aiming to produce a permanent ceasefire, Hamas seeks to emerge from the war still standing. In contrast, Israel has sought only temporary ceasefires, stating that any ceasefire which does not allow them to achieve their war goals (the return of hostages and the "destruction" of Hamas) will be unacceptable to them. As such, any post-war setting where Hamas retains any sort of position in the Gaza Strip is highly likely to be refused by Israel. Israel has a greater ability to enforce their wishes for a post-war Gaza, having proven themselves the dominant military force in Gaza..Scenario Two: Fatah and Hamas Form A Unity GovernmentAs an alternative to exclusive Hamas rule, some have proposed a compromise involving a unity government with Fatah, which would aim to bridge the political divide and potentially create a more balanced leadership for both Gaza and the West Bank. As previously mentioned, Hamas and Fatah have, on several occasions, attempted to mend the rift between them. These attempts have thus far failed. However, their relationship may now be on the path to recovery, creating an alternative path forward and a potential bridge between Gaza and the West Bank.Since the war began in October reconciliation efforts between the two parties have intensified. These efforts appear to have been successful after a recent meeting in China in late July when they signed a "national unity" agreement..The agreement would see the formation of a unified interim government between Hamas and Fatah before legislative elections in a post-war setting, leading to joint governance of the Palestinian territories, including Gaza.Assuming the reconciliation efforts and joint government were to be successful, this would provide a bridge between Gaza and the West Bank to be under one, Palestinian government.However, Israel has outright refused any outcome of the war that leaves Hamas in power in any way, shape, or form, and so it is incredibly unlikely that a joint Hamas-Fatah government would be accepted by Israel, particularly considering Israel has already resisted a Fatah-led government taking over Gaza.In the case that Hamas and Fatah do form a joint administration, it is likely that more nations than Israel would refuse it. When Hamas won the 2006 legislative elections and entered into the PA government, many western nations (and Israel) boycotted the government, ending their cooperation with the PA. This cooperation only resumed once Hamas and Fatah had split, effectively ending Hamas' presence in the PA.A new Hamas-Fatah government, particularly within the current context of Hamas' conflict with Israel, would likely be subject to a similar fate.There are also a series of key differences between Hamas and Fatah, namely Hamas' support for armed resistance versus Fatah's support for negotiation, that stand in the way of a truly unified Palestinian government.Thus, proponents of a stable and democratic Palestine run into a problem. On the one hand, democracy is desired in Palestine but such an institution (at least for the time being) seems to bring about some form of militant extremism – an obstacle to stability. On the other hand, achieving stability would likely require a government that, by definition, cannot be democratic (given Hamas’ dominance), and instead would rely on a non-elected authority capable of maintaining peace and pursuing diplomatic solutions. Given the unacceptability of Hamas in the eyes of the Israelis and many in the international community, the latter scenario seems to be more likely.This problem, however, is not unique to Palestine. Historically speaking, monarchies and military dictatorships have fared better than democracies in this part of the world. While many reasons exist, the presence of political Islam has been a significant barrier to stable democracy. This has been the case in Palestine’s next-door neighbor, Egypt, whose military took control after the Muslim brotherhood gained significant political power. Most recently, Kuwait, which was once viewed as a promising up-and-coming democracy, had to disband articles of its constitution after extremist factions found their way into the government through democratic means. Even in Turkey, once a model for secular democracy in the Muslim world, the government relied heavily on military-backed measures to keep Islamist movements in check—though ultimately, even this proved insufficient as Islamist parties eventually gained power through democratic channels. Given this history, it is likely that Palestine could follow a similar path where the most stable option is established not through democratic elections, but through leadership whose primary concern is maintaining peace and stability by curbing extremist forces..Scenario Three: A Federalist PalestineNevertheless, there have been proposals aimed at creating the conditions for a more democratic system by supporting the emergence of new political figures. These initiatives seek to promote alternatives to Hamas and foster governance that aligns with broader regional and international interests. However, the involvement of foreign actors like the US, Israel, and neighboring Arab states plays a significant role in shaping these efforts, raising questions about how genuinely democratic such a process would be.Indeed, some have proposed introducing and supporting new actors to manage governance in the Palestinian territories. Among these suggestions is the idea of decentralizing power by involving influential local families and clan leaders who hold significant sway within their communities. Despite the dominance of Hamas in Gaza and the PA in the West Bank, Palestinian society remains highly fragmented along family, clan, and tribal lines. These traditional structures still play a critical role in social and political dynamics, with many Palestinians aligning more closely with their local leaders than with the larger political factions. As a result, some experts argue that empowering these local figures could help create a more representative and stable governance model that resonates with the population..Despite this, even if elections were held with new actors and players, there is a high likelihood that the outcome would resemble some form of the status quo—where fragmented Palestinian political parties consolidate power over their respective territories and remain hostile towards each other. This disunity poses significant risks to any democratic transition. In a society with little experience or respect for democratic processes, the presence of multiple competing factions could easily lead to serious internal conflicts and political disorganization. The lack of established democratic norms means that these groups, many of whom have no history of effective governance, could struggle to manage the complexities of a functioning state.On top of all these challenges, Hamas remains a significant factor, particularly in Gaza. Although weakened, Hamas is still the most organized and powerful faction in the territory and could easily co-opt or subdue these local leaders, as it has done in the past. This dynamic makes it difficult to imagine a scenario where any newly introduced governance model, especially one involving multiple inexperienced factions, could avoid being subverted by Hamas. Ultimately, the risk of deepening fragmentation, conflict, and a return to autocratic control looms large, making the prospects of a genuine democratic process leading to stable governance in Palestine highly uncertain. .Scenario Four: The Palestinian Authority Rules PalestineOutside of these alternatives exists the option to implement the PA. This plan of action is most favored by the Biden administration and presents itself with several advantages. Firstly, the PA has experience administering both the West Bank and Gaza and is the favored Palestinian faction among the international community. It also has a history of working with Israel and neighboring Arab countries and has a strong enough presence to withstand Hamas and other extremist rebellions.This being said, a PA run Palestine presents itself with challenges. Indeed, the PA remains deeply unpopular among Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza. According to recent polling, 90 percent of Palestinians disapprove of Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority, and 60 percent of Palestinians support dissolving the PA. The PA has historically been rampant with corruption and has often failed at administering basic services in the West Bank. As mentioned earlier, it has also proved itself inefficient in handling the Israeli Settlements in the West Bank which has continued to bring down their already low approval ratings. Not only have they proved ineffective, many Palestinians see the PA as puppets for Israeli wants and needs.In addition to this, the Israelis themselves are untrustworthy of the PA. They don’t particularly view the PA as significantly more moderate, often pointing to the fact that the PA has distributed textbooks that support violence against Jews, send money to families of dead or jailed Palestinian militants and has still not relinquished the Palestinian right to return. When discussing the future of Gaza, the Israelis have opposed a PA-run Gaza – Netanyahu has stated that such a state would be a “terror haven.”This statement, however, is not entirely unfounded. Predicting what a PA-run Palestine would look like is challenging, and one potential outcome could be a scenario where, in the eyes of the international community, Hamas appears absent but continues to operate behind the scenes as a covert military force. In this situation, while the PA may nominally control governance, Hamas could still exert influence through its armed presence, creating a complex power dynamic that undermines true stability. This is the case in neighboring Lebanon which, on paper, is a sovereign country with it’s independent military force and a government containing multiple political parties. These parties include the Lebanese Forces, the Amal Movement and Hezbollah – the primary extremist Shia political party. Despite the presence of Lebanon’s official military, Hezbollah’s armed forces remain arguably the most powerful in the country, effectively granting them a monopoly on violence and positioning them as a competitor to the centralized government’s military. Given Hamas’ popularity and extensive social and political networks within the Palestinian territories, a similar scenario could emerge if the PA were to take over, with Hamas continuing to wield significant influence behind the scenes..Given this scenario, if the PA were to be the governing authority in Palestine, it is also very likely that the Israelis would work with the PA to run regular counter-insurgency operations. The last ten months have shown that, while Hamas’ forces have been severely diminished, they still maintain a strong ideological presence in the region. To address this, Israel would likely need to target Hamas-controlled pockets wherever they emerge, preventing them from regrouping or re-establishing influence. However, such actions could risk undermining the PA’s legitimacy, as they may be perceived by their own population as collaborators or Israeli proxies..Scenario Five: Arab States and International Bodies Step InAnother proposed option for the future governance of Palestine, particularly Gaza, involves multiple foreign countries and international organizations, including the UN, stepping in to administer the region. In this scenario, a coalition of Arab states and international actors would take on the responsibility of maintaining order, providing services, and facilitating reconstruction efforts. While this could potentially bring a level of stability, it also comes with significant challenges. For Arab countries involved, the stakes are high. Any resurgence of Hamas or an increase in Palestinian suffering under their watch could trigger unrest at home. For instance, Jordan, with its large Palestinian population, would be especially vulnerable to protests. Jordan is still very much aware of the events of "Black September," in which the Palestinian Liberation Organization tried to stage an insurrection against Jordan's Hashemite Government. Similarly, other Arab nations where public sentiment strongly supports the Palestinian cause could face domestic backlash if they are perceived as complicit in Israeli interests or unable to manage the situation effectively.On the international side, the involvement of UN-type organizations presents its own set of problems. History has shown that such organizations often have limited power when it comes to effective governance. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which was established to provide aid and support to Palestinian refugees, has faced significant criticism over the years. It has been accused of inefficiency, corruption, and even ties to Hamas, raising concerns about the effectiveness and neutrality of such organizations in a governance role. If international bodies were to take the lead in governing Gaza, they would need to overcome these structural weaknesses, which is a significant hurdle. Furthermore, the presence of foreign administrators could be viewed with suspicion by the local population, risking their legitimacy and creating fertile ground for extremist groups to re-emerge..Scenario Six: Israeli OccupationAnother option for the future of Palestine, particularly Gaza, is a renewed Israeli occupation of the territory. This would involve Israel fully administering services, maintaining law and order, and taking direct control over the region, similar to its governance of Gaza before the 2005 disengagement. During the previous occupation, essential services, infrastructure, and daily administration ran relatively efficiently under Israeli control. Advocates of this approach argue that over time, such an occupation could help de-radicalize the population, stabilize the area, and eventually transition governance to more moderate, locally elected Palestinian leaders..However, this option presents significant challenges. Firstly, a renewed Israeli occupation would severely undermine Palestinian sovereignty, potentially further entrenching resentment and resistance among the Palestinian population, who would view it as an oppressive foreign rule. This would also hinder any efforts to unify Gaza and the West Bank under a single Palestinian authority, deepening the division between the two territories rather than bringing them together. Additionally, there is little appetite within Israel for such a move, despite Netanyahu's insistence on Israel holding security over Gaza after the war. The financial burden, along with the need to deploy significant numbers of soldiers, would be immense, and many Israelis remember that they left Gaza in 2005 precisely to avoid the ongoing drain of resources and human life.Moreover, an Israeli reoccupation would severely damage Israel’s international reputation. It could escalate tensions with neighboring Arab countries like Lebanon and Iran, while also straining relationships with emerging regional partners such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, whose support Israel has been carefully cultivating. This approach would likely be seen as a step backward by the international community and could further isolate Israel diplomatically, all while failing to address the core issues needed for long-term peace and stability in the region..Scenario Seven: Failed States and Low-Boil TerrorismLooking at Gaza specifically, if all other options fail, the most concerning possibility is that it devolves into a failed state. In this scenario, governance would collapse entirely with various extremist factions, criminal networks, or rival militias attempting to rule the area. Basic services, law and order, and any semblance of organized society would disintegrate. A failed state would not only result in unimaginable suffering for the Palestinian people but also pose a significant security threat to the region, with instability potentially spilling over into neighboring countries. The consequences of such a scenario are difficult to predict, but it would likely lead to a humanitarian disaster, increased extremism, and prolonged conflict, making any future attempts at peace even more challenging..The Road to Peace Is Filled with Trial and ErrorIn conclusion, the best-case scenario may involve a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) taking control with international and regional support. Despite its flaws, the PA is seen by many key actors—including the United States and several regional powers—as the most viable option for maintaining stability. A reformed PA could, in theory, offer a more pragmatic governance model that aligns with international interests while preventing the rise of extremist groups like Hamas. Regardless of the outcome, however, it is very likely that Israel will continue to run counter-insurgency operations in the Palestinian territories in order to prevent another national security failure like that of October 7th. Thus, as we've seen, the prospect of a truly democratic and sovereign Palestinian state remains far off. The deep-seated political divisions and strong presence of extremism make such a vision unlikely to materialize in the near future. For now, the focus will likely remain on pragmatic solutions that prioritize stability over idealistic goals of full democratic sovereignty.*Written in cooperation by Alexandre Reza and Sebastien Gray