The Future of US-Saudi Relations

The Past & Present of the US-Saudi RelationshipBetween 1945 and the mid-2010s, the United States and Saudi Arabia enjoyed a special partnership. From President Franklin D. Roosevelt's famous meeting with Saudi King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud aboard the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal in 1945, to US support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, to the US-led coalition's expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1991, oil-for-security proved to be a strong foundation for Saudi-American alignment. The US needed engagement with Saudi Arabia to maintain energy flows and anchor stability in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, for its part, gained immense wealth and security and later integrated into the global economy as a major energy player. Today, the relationship remains rooted in mutual strategic interests: the US relies on Saudi Arabia as a counterbalance to Iranian influence and the Saudis continue to rely on American arms sales and military protection..Between 1945 and the mid-2010s, the United States and Saudi Arabia enjoyed a special partnership. From President Franklin D. Roosevelt's famous meeting with Saudi King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud aboard the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal in 1945, to US support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, to the US-led coalition's expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1991, oil-for-security proved to be a strong foundation for Saudi-American alignment. The US needed engagement with Saudi Arabia to maintain energy flows and anchor stability in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, for its part, gained immense wealth and security and later integrated into the global economy as a major energy player. Today, the relationship remains rooted in mutual strategic interests: the US relies on Saudi Arabia as a counterbalance to Iranian influence and the Saudis continue to rely on American arms sales and military protection.But over the last several years, the relationship has frayed. The US' move toward energy independence has reduced its reliance on Saudi oil; its aim to become an energy superpower even makes it a future competitor. Differing perspectives on certain regional priorities–namely, how best to deal with Iran–have created a degree of strategic division. The infamous murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 and the momentary commitment to re-evaluate US support for the Kingdom that it spurred reminded both sides of the degree to which their systems diverge ideologically. To be sure, these emerging tensions must be considered alongside strong, continued shared interests. That the Biden administration has spent the better part of the past year seeking to broker an effectively trilateral "megadeal" between the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel shows this. But the question remains: where is the Saudi-American relationship headed?.Strategic Interests & Visions for the Future.Answering that question requires looking at each country's visions for the future–for their country, the world system, and their country's role in it. Starting with Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) envisions a transformative future, best displayed by his Saudi Vision 2030 megaproject. He aims to diversify the Saudi economy and society with ambitious, city-scale development projects and infrastructure investment. With this, he hopes to future-proof the Saudi economy, using its vast oil profits in the short- and medium-term to fund his country's transition away from oil in the long term. Strategically, MBS is steering Saudi Arabia toward an omni-aligned foreign policy consisting of deep working relations with all major centers of power. In a world where great power competition seems likely to remain, this is how Saudi Arabia plans to maximize its geopolitical influence and minimize the risks associated with over-reliance on any single great power. This strategy is meant to be flexible and adaptive. It ensures that Saudi Arabia remains secure no matter what is to come, whether the future includes a massive and unexpected change in the world system, a more predictable US retrenchment, or a stable continuation of things..On the American side, this vision is currently undergoing a transition. While strategic interest in Persian Gulf security, counterterrorism, and energy stability continue to drive US policy in the Middle East, shifting global priorities and political dynamics at home are causing seismic shifts in the pillars that for decades underpinned US engagement in the region. The commitment to Persian Gulf security remains strong, as the US continues to have a deep interest in protecting critical maritime routes and in preventing the emergence of Iranian regional dominance. However, virtually every other interest has been impacted in one way or another. Counterterrorism, once the global basis of American foreign policy, has taken a back seat to great power competition. While there remains broad support among US politicians for continued involvement in local partnerships and drone warfare, the general trend is of US disengagement from counterterror efforts in the region. Similarly, the issue of energy stability might well be on its way to being a non-issue, or at least not a strategic necessity. Driven by the shale revolution and the US' move toward energy independence, planners are re-evaluating military engagements meant solely to protect energy supplies. Finally, the specter of Iranian nuclear ambition–which makes defense more complicated and expensive–and the need to reallocate resources toward containing China has led the US to explore options for transitioning out of its primacy in the Middle East..Within these visions, there are several areas where American and Saudi strategic interests can continue to align in the future, primarily with Iran. To put it simply, both countries see Iranian influence as malign. The US and Saudi Arabia, therefore, will probably continue to cooperate in Persian Gulf security. Additionally, should Iran continue down the path of nuclearization–and the US or Israel doesn't respond with force–there might be room for deepened security cooperation based around US assistance for a Saudi nuclear program. This would likely also come with the sale of advanced arms and next-generation weapons systems, things the Kingdom has previously been denied, and therefore is another pull factor for Saudi alignment with the US. Secondary interests in counterterrorism will also maintain ample space for military and intelligence cooperation regardless of whether the US reduces its counterterror footprint or commits to a deeper security agreement. Similarly, Saudi Vision 2030 incentivizes maintaining, if not securing, access to the US economy due to its aim to foster an advanced, knowledge-based economy and attract foreign investment. The US and its Western allies can play a crucial role here, representing another potential basis for future strategic alignment..On the other hand, there are significant areas of divergence between these visions. Again, a primary issue is Iran. Riyadh has not forgotten when Washington ignored its wishes to pursue a nuclear deal with Iran, and neither has it forgotten Washington's non-response to the attack on Saudi oil facilities by Iran in 2019. While some impulses in American politics would dictate that the US heap pressure upon Iran, others advocate a sort of rapprochement. Therefore, just as the US' Iran policy could provide the basis for US-Saudi alignment, it could also be the reason why the two countries split; it all depends on US domestic politics. Another primary issue is the US' emergence as a major energy producer. This has both reduced American dependence on Saudi oil and altered the economic foundations of the US-Saudi relationship, with the United States potentially becoming a competitor–rather than a partner–of the Saudi oil economy. Beyond these are issues rooted in the conduct of American diplomacy. The spat between the US and Saudi Arabia early in the Biden administration underscored the potential of American ideology to get in the way of important cooperation. Furthermore, the US has a problem (a relic of the unipolar moment) with treating partners' decisions as a loyalty litmus test and subsequently issuing ill-thought-out diplomatic ultimatums that push against the natural impulses of partner states as dictated by their national interests. If the US–a liberal nation in a world of increasing authoritarianism–does not learn how to bite its tongue, issues such as these will have the potential to collapse pragmatic relationships..The Possible Futures of the US-Saudi Relationship.Scenario 1: Continuation of Current Path.In this scenario, the US-Saudi relationship continues on its current trajectory–managing a declining de facto alliance. Both nations will continue to balance their immediate needs with their long-term strategic interests, albeit with increasing complexity, as the old tenets of the relationship (arms, security cooperation, and oil partnership) weaken, some more than others. The relationship will remain fundamentally rooted in mutual benefit, but the partnership will drift, accompanied by omni-alignment. Saudi Arabia will try to maintain security cooperation with the US while more actively engaging with the world's powers, be they minor, middle, or major powers. Saudi Vision 2030 will push it to attract global talent from the US, China, and the EU, among others. On the other hand, the US will maintain its strategic interests in Persian Gulf security and countering Iranian influence but will recalibrate its role in light of its broader global focus. Washington will expect that Saudi Arabia and other regional allies begin to shoulder more of the security burden, stepping up where it has to and pulling back where it can. This scenario sees the United States and Saudi Arabia maintain their alliance with some continued special preference toward the other but with greater flexibility on both sides and a cautious eye on shifting global dynamics..Scenario 2: Downgrade of the Relationship.In this scenario, the US-Saudi relationship takes on a more transactional tenor accompanied by the loss of the alliance's traditional depth. Increased mutual distrust and a reduction in strategic commitments are to be expected, reflecting what might be a coming global shift toward relationships based on immediate, pragmatic concerns. Saudi Arabia will pursue omni-alignment aggressively, with little preference for the US. It will deepen its partnerships with the US' rivals, and it will–no longer viewing the US as indispensable–foster a web of security arrangements with other powers. The United States will also act more transactionally, reflecting both its shift eastward and its reduced (and potentially eliminated) dependence on oil from the Middle East. As long as counterterrorism and the need to counterbalance Iran remain, the US will maintain a certain degree of security and arms cooperation with Saudi Arabia. But the relationship will now be shallow, if still functional. In this scenario, with US-Saudi cooperation increasingly driven by immediate needs rather than shared strategic vision, weakened coordination could leave gaps in deterrence from which regional volatility increases. Additionally, as Saudi Arabia diversifies economically and in security matters, the global energy market could face increased competition, if not fragmentation..Scenario 3: Formalization of the Alliance.In this scenario, the US-Saudi relationship receives an upgrade – a de jure modern alliance. The Saudis are most worried about their immediate military and ideological threat (Iran) and their long-term economic viability. If they see a route toward securing and bolstering these two needs through enhanced alignment with the US (and the West), they could do away with omni-alignment. This would likely come with a formalized military pact in which Saudi Arabia receives robust defense commitments from the US as well as previously unavailable US weapons and technology and potentially nuclear assistance. Additionally, Saudi Arabia would benefit from increased economic integration with the West and increased investment into Saudi Vision 2030 by the world's most advanced economies. The United States, for its part, would recognize the strategic importance of building Saudi defense capabilities such that countering Iranian influence becomes more effective and less expensive. This would provide the US with a reliable Middle Eastern partner for ensuring Persian Gulf stability and maritime security. It would also help the US as it manages other issues, like the Palestinian Question and the Israel-Iran escalation dynamic. In this scenario, regional stability would be enhanced and the ability of revisionist powers like China and Russia to enter into the Middle East would be reduced. Additionally, this would almost certainly come with Saudi recognition of Israel..Scenario 4: Saudis Jump Ship.In this low probability, high risk scenario, Saudi Arabia shifts its primary alliance from the United States to China or an emerging revisionist bloc more broadly. This would be an extremely risky gamble, as it would bet that China (or others) can effectively restrain Iran. The security situation around Saudi Arabia is delicately balanced as Axis of Resistance groups almost completely surround Saudi Arabia, which currently relies on American support and an alignment of counter-Iran interests with Israel for most of its deterrence. Spurning the US wholesale could jeopardize Saudi security, and China's ability–or that of some other partner–to provide the same level of military and strategic support is doubtful..The Way Forward.The future of the US-Saudi relationship will be shaped by an evolving global landscape, US domestic politics, and, most importantly, a convergence–or lack thereof–in national interests. While there are several possible scenarios outlined above, a discernible convergence of certain strategic imperatives–particularly regarding regional security, economic modernization, and countering Iranian influence–suggests that a deeper and more formalized US-Saudi partnership may be on the horizon. Indeed, following the initial setback presented by Hamas' attack on October 7th, American and Saudi diplomats have restarted their work on the trilateral megadeal that is likely to include Saudi-Israeli normalization and heightened levels of military and economic cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the United States. American presidents have long sought such a deal, and there are signs that MBS has made it his top priority. One piece of evidence is that the resumption of talks was revealed to the media in the immediate aftermath of a high-profile incident in which an Iranian-backed militia killed three US soldiers (see: Tower 22 drone attack); it seems MBS decided that the momentary reminder of the Iranian threat and the noise generated by the then-forthcoming American response made it a great time to reveal to his highly anti-Israeli public that he was again pursuing a deal that implicitly involves Israel..Additionally, it seems that MBS is sending the diplomatic house to get the US to pressure Israel into allowing a Palestinian state, even telling members of Congress that he would be at risk of assassination should he pursue the megadeal without a credible path to a Palestinian state. While what form it will appear in is uncertain, an upgrade to the US-Saudi partnership is clearly both sides' preference for the future.