The New Aviation Threat the FAA Isn’t Telling You About

Recent data reveals a troubling surge in GPS spoofing incidents, significantly impacting flight safety. The average number of flights encountering GPS spoofing has skyrocketed from 200 per day during January-March 2024 to approximately 900 daily in the second quarter of 2024. On some days, the number has soared to 1,350 flights. Flight crews are also reporting an increase in the intensity of spoofing, raising serious concerns about aviation safety..Initially, GPS spoofing was predominantly reported in northern Iraq, Egypt, and Israel. However, recent months have seen new hotspots emerging in the Black Sea, Cyprus, the Korean border, and Russia. The number of affected locations has expanded from three to more than ten, complicating efforts to mitigate the risks..Safety Risks Intensify.For flight crews, the increasing frequency and intensity of GPS spoofing pose evolving safety risks. Initially, spoofing mainly caused navigational issues, such as unexpected autopilot turns and loss of Inertial Reference Systems (IRS). However, air traffic control (ATC) could often resolve these issues through radar vectors..This year, a second set of more severe risks has emerged. GPS is deeply integrated into many aircraft systems, making them vulnerable to spoofing. The Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS), crucial for preventing Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accidents, has become unreliable. False alerts, sometimes occurring hours after a spoofing event, have led crews to inhibit the system, undermining trust in this critical safety device..Moreover, go-arounds caused by spoofing are becoming more common, driven by false EGPWS alerts, incorrect wind indications on the Navigation Display, and unusual autopilot or glideslope/localizer behaviors. Each go-around increases crew workload and reduces the safety margin, highlighting the need for urgent action..Systemic Impact on Aviation Safety.Other aircraft systems affected by spoofing include Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), Head-Up Displays (HUD), and transponders. The aircraft clock, often one of the first systems to fail during a spoofing encounter, disrupts functions like Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC), adding to the complexity of managing spoofed flights. Eurocontrol reports daily occurrences of these issues..In oceanic and remote regions, where onboard navigation accuracy is critical, air traffic control has become increasingly challenging. Shanwick and Gander Oceanic Control Centers frequently handle aircraft unable to meet Required Navigation Performance 4 (RNP4) standards due to spoofing, sometimes necessitating diversions to Iceland..These evolving safety risks are largely unaddressed, posing latent dangers that will only become evident when an accident attributable to spoofing occurs. A significant layer of aviation safety, the "Swiss Cheese" model, has been compromised..The "Swiss Cheese" model, developed by British psychologist James Reason, is a crucial concept in aviation risk management and safety. It visualizes safety systems as multiple layers of defense, each represented as slices of Swiss cheese with inherent flaws or "holes." These holes symbolize weaknesses in each layer, such as technical failures, human errors, or procedural lapses. An accident occurs when these holes align, allowing a hazard to pass through all the layers and result in an adverse event..Establishment of GPS Spoofing Workgroup.In response, a GPS Spoofing Workgroup has been established to address these challenges. Running from July 17 to August 14, the Workgroup aims to bring the international civil aviation community together to tackle the issue. The group will collect data, survey flight crews, discuss problem elements, and produce a community report to support discussions at the 14th ICAO Air Navigation Conference in late August..The Workgroup includes 450 participants, representing industry organizations such as IFALPA, IFATCA, OPSGROUP, IBAC, EBAA, ECA, and BALPA, as well as airlines like Aer Lingus, Alaska Airlines, Cathay Pacific, and Turkish Airlines. Technical experts from NASA, Boeing, Collins Aerospace, and other organizations will also contribute, along with aviation authorities from Sweden, Canada, Singapore, Thailand, the UK, and the FAA..Crew Experiences Highlight Real-World Challenges.Real-world incidents further illustrate the dangers of GPS spoofing. One report from a crew departing LLBG/Tel Aviv to BIRK/Reykjavik in a G650 highlights the severity of the issue. The crew followed GAC procedures by shutting down GPS and Hybrid IRS when taking off from Tel Aviv, which is known for spoofing and jamming. Upon reactivating systems two hours later over Turkey, they encountered problems on approach at BIRK, including a false "TERRAIN TERRAIN" warning and subsequent go-around. A technical expert suggested that even when GPS inputs are deselected, spoofing can still impact aircraft systems..Innovative Solutions and Future Prospects.As intentional GPS interference becomes more common, innovative solutions are emerging. A California startup, oneNav, proposes using the newest GPS signal, L5, which is designed for aviation safety services and is more resistant to jamming. The "L5 direct" receiver developed by oneNav can acquire L5 signals without relying on older L1 signals, enhancing its resistance to interference..oneNav has conducted successful tests in high-jamming areas like Israel and the Poland-Ukraine border, demonstrating that L5 signals remain unaffected by widespread L1 jamming. This technology could be pivotal for military applications, including drones, precision-guided weapons, and troop trackers..Despite its promise, the L5 signal is not yet widely used, as it is currently broadcast by only 17 of the 31 GPS satellites. Full operational capability is expected around 2027, pending the implementation of the next-generation Operational Control System (OCX). This system is essential for leveraging L5's full capabilities but is behind schedule..oneNav's innovative approach has garnered attention, including investment from In-Q-Tel, the U.S. intelligence community's venture capital arm. The Pentagon is also exploring various Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) technologies to reduce dependence on GPS.