Bhutan and China Border Meeting Shows China’s Use of Coercive Tactics in Land Disputes

Bhutanese and Chinese delegations held the 14th Expert Group Meeting (EGM) on China-Bhutan Boundary Issues in the Bhutanese capital city of Thimphu from August 20th to the 22nd. The EGM was co-chaired by Hong Liang, China's Foreign Affairs Ministry (FAM) Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs' Director General, and Letho Tobhen Tangbi, Secretary General for the International Boundaries of Bhutan and Head of the Bhutanese Expert Group..The 14th Expert Group Meeting on China-Bhutan Boundary Issues.Both sides "reviewed the positive progress" made in negotiations between the countries regarding demarcating the boundary in recent years. The delegations had "friendly, candid, and constructive discussions" on topics of mutual concern and interest, such as the implementation of the Three-Step Roadmap. The two sides also discussed the Joint Technical Team on the Delimitation and Demarcation of China-Bhutan Boundary's second meeting and the implementation of the Cooperation Agreement on the Functions of the Joint Technical Team on the Delimitation and Demarcation of the China-Bhutan Boundary. The talks were held in a "cordial and friendly atmosphere," reflecting the cooperative and friendly relations between China and Bhutan..Previous Meetings on Boundary Issues.Since 1951, Bhutan shares a 296-mile (477-kilometer) border with China along the western, northern, and eastern sides of the country. However, the two countries dispute the ownership of four territories in the western, three in the northern, and one in the eastern areas of Bhutan. The country claims the Beyul Khenpajong and the Menchuma Velley in the north; Doklam, Dramana and Shakhatoe; Sinchulungpa and Langmarpo Valley; Yak chu and Charithang chu in the west; and Sakteng in the east. In the 1980s, Bhutan gave up its claim to Kula Khari, saying its original claim was due to a mapping error..Bhutan and China held previous meetings and consultations to solve the border issue. In October 2023, the 25th Round of Boundary Talks between China and Bhutan was held in Beijing, China. FAM Vice Minister Sun Weidong led the Chinese delegation, while Foreign Affairs and External Trade Minister Tandi Dorji led the Bhutanese group. Both sides had "in-depth discussions on the boundary negotiations" and noted the progress that the EGMs made since the 24th Round of Boundary Talks held in 2016. Sun and Tandi commended the expert groups "for the work done and agreed to build on the positive momentum.".The leaders also signed the Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan on the Responsibilities and Functions of the Joint Technical Team on the Delimitation and Demarcation of the China-Bhutan Boundary. The team were created during the 13th EGM to assist the Expert Groups to implement the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Three-Step Roadmap. Both sides agreed "to continue working together to simultaneously push forward the implementation of all the steps of the roadmap. The "discussions were held in a warm and friendly atmosphere," and both sides exchanged views on "enhancing bilateral relations and matters of mutual interest." The Bhutanese delegation visited Chinese cultural and historical sites during the visit..In August 2023, the two countries held the 13th EGM on the China-Bhutan Boundary Issues in Beijing. Hong and Tangbi led the delegations and co-chaired the meeting. Both sides had "candid, friendly, and constructive discussions" on the continuous implementation of the MOU on the Three-Step Roadmap for Expediting the China-Bhutan Boundary Negotiations that built on the "consensus reached at the 12th EGM." Bhutan and China agreed "to expedite and take simultaneous steps to implement" the Three-Step Roadmap. The 13th EGM resulted in the establishment of the Joint Technical Team (JTT) on the Delimitation of the China-Bhutan Boundary. The JTT also held its first meeting on the sidelines of the 13th EGM. Both sides agreed to maintain the "positive momentum of frequent EGMs," to hold the 14th EGM "as soon as possible," and to maintain "communication on holding the 25th Round of China-Bhutan Boundary Talk.".Bhutan and China Border Dispute.The border dispute between Bhutan and China began in 1912 when the Qing Dynasty was abolished and replaced with the Republic of China (RoC) and Tibet declared independence. The RoC maintained the Qing Dynasty's claims to both Tibet and areas along the Tibetan Bhutan border. The People's Republic of China chose to maintain the RoC's claim to the territories after it won the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and annexed Tibet in 1951. During the 1950s, China published maps that identified the Bhutanese territories as belonging to China to support their claims. The China government also began to send People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers and Tibetan herdsmen to enter the disputed areas to pressure the kingdom to enter direct negotiations instead of relying on India to represent its interests. However, Bhutan began to represent itself in various international forums after it became a United Nations member in 1971..In 1974, Bhutan invited the Chinese ambassador to India to attend the coronation of Jigme Singye Wangchuk to symbolically restart relations. The kingdom also gradually relinquished its claims to Kula Khari, a 154 square mile (398 square kilometer) area located along its border with China throughout the 1980s. Both countries also began talks to establish a bilateral relationship in 1983. In 1984, Bhutan and China began to hold annual meetings to solve the border issues. China and Bhutan discussed the possibility of trading Jakarlung and Pasamlung regions for the Doklam, Gieu, and Sinchulumpa areas in 1996, with Bhutan accepting the agreement as a general plan. However, the two countries signed an agreement where China confirmed its respect for Bhutan's sovereignty and territorial integrity, with both sides agreeing to build up ties based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in 1998..Beginning in the mid-1990s, the incursions by Tibetan herdsmen into the northern areas became significantly more aggressive, with reports of cattle theft, illegal timber harvests, and herdmen forcing Bhutanese herders to pay large taxes for grazing permissions. In 2004, the incursions by PLA soldiers also escalated tensions because they conducted patrols deeper into the disputed territory of Beyul Khenpajong. China ordered the construction of six roadways near the disputed areas along Bhutan's western border, with four of them crossing into the country. While China stopped construction of the roads after Bhutanese authorities protested, they resumed building in 2005. The two sides also did not hold any ESMs or other discussions about the border for a three-year period beginning in 2006. During this time, however, PLA soldiers conducted approximately 38 incursions along Bhutan's western borders, with Bhutan lodging at least seven diplomatic protests..In 2012, a Chinese survey team conducted the first land and resources survey in Beyul Khenpajong, with construction beginning in 2013 after Bhutan rejected China's offers of economic aid in return for renouncing their territorial claims. In 2015, China began construction of the first road in the region that crossed into Bhutan via the Namgung La mountain pass. During this time, China also established at least four villages in the Beyul Khenpajong and Menchuma Valley. China resumed construction of a roadway near the Doklam Plateau that would reach the Indian border in 2017. The Indian military responded on behalf of Bhutan by deploying soldiers to stop the roadway's construction that led to a two-month standoff. The standoff ended when China agreed to stop construction efforts and both countries agreed to pull their troops from the area..In 2020, China objected to the Global Environmental Facility giving Bhutan a grant for the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary. The sanctuary is located in eastern Bhutan, and China never included the territory in the dispute until it raised an objection. The two countries signed the MoU for the Three-Step Roadmap to expedite boundary negotiation discussions in 2021, which saw little progress because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2017 Doklam Standoff..Recent Meeting Illustrates China's Use of Coercive Tactics and Bhutan's Ability to Not to Yield to Their Use.The dispute illustrates how China uses coercive tactics to gain leverage over Bhutan and force the country to give up territories that it views as having a strategic advantage in the region. China will use the dispute to increase its regional influence by forcing Bhutan to establish a diplomatic relationship with the country in return for concessions. China employs a variety of tactics to gain enough leverage against Bhutan to force the country to relinquish its claims to the four territories along its western border. The country views these lands as providing the country a strategic advantage versus India because it is located next to the Siliguri Corridor..The corridor is a stretch of land that measures 12 to 14 miles (20 to 22 kilometers) at its narrowest point and connects India with the northeastern portion of the country. China's control over the Doklam Plateau area would allow the PLA to cut off the northeastern states from the rest of India during a conflict between the two countries over disputed areas along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The PLA units could capture and secure the disputed areas along the LAC while mitigating the Indian military's ability to respond and reinforce units in the area..China decided to build villages and infrastructure in the northern areas to force Bhutan to accept its terms to end the dispute. For example, China knows that Bhutan would never trade land in the Beyul Khenpajong area because of its spiritual importance to Tibetan Buddhism and the monarchy. China included Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in the dispute in an effort to increase the pressure on Bhutan..China hopes that increasing the amount of land it includes in the overall dispute would eventually force the Bhutanese government to accept its terms. However, the ESMs and discussions held between the two countries illustrate Bhutan's unwillingness to accept China's terms because of the potential fallout that might occur. Bhutan would need to consult with India before signing any agreement that involves the transfer of western territories, especially Doklam. India understands the Siliguri Corridor's strategic importance and wants to prevent any agreement because it would swing the strategic advantage to China in the LAC dispute..Bhutan would not agree to any agreement that ends the border dispute if it meant it compromises its neutrality and becomes aligned with China. For example, Bhutan understands that tying the border agreement with establishing diplomatic relations is part of the country's efforts to increase influence in the South Asia region. China would significantly increase its influence in Bhutan if the two countries established diplomatic relations with each other, which the country would use to deepen ties..However, Bhutan understands that if the country establishes diplomatic relations with China, India will pressure it to do the same. Bhutan's decision would place the kingdom in an unfavorable position because it could no longer rely on the argument that it is a neutral country. The kingdom used the neutrality principle to govern interactions with China and India, but also with other countries, such as the United States. The foreign policy change regarding neurtality would place Bhutan in a position where it would need to choose between aligning with China or India.