What Are Chinese Vessels Doing in the Bering Sea?

On July 11th, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) stated that four People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels were in the Bering Sea on July 6th and July 7th. The incident is the fourth time that USCG vessels have encountered PLAN ships in the area since August 2021..U.S. Coast Guard Statement.The incident occurred when the USCG Cutter (USCGC) Kimball, a Legend class cutter, detected three vessels located approximately 124 miles (200 kilometers) north of the Amchitka Pass in the Aleutian Islands. A USGC HC-130J based out of USCG Air Station Kodiak detected a fourth vessel located around 84 miles (135 kilometers) north of the Amukta Pass. The statement said that the four vessels "were transiting in international waters but still inside the US Exclusive Economic Zone, which extends 200 nautical miles from the US shoreline.".The Seventeenth Coast Guard District, USCG Read Admiral Megan Dean, described the Chinese naval presence as "operated in accordance with international rules and norms." Dean said that the Kimball met the PLAN's presence "to ensure there were no disruptions to US interests in the maritime environment around Alaska." The PLAN vessels communicated with the Kimball and HC-130J during the incident, stating that their stated purpose was to conduct "freedom of navigation operations." The cutter monitored the flotilla until it moved south of the Aleutian Islands and into the North Pacific Ocean. The statement said that the USCG and US Northern Command knew about and tracked the Chinese flotilla in the Bering Sea. The statement also mentioned the two previous incidents when USCG vessels encountered and monitored Chinese ships in the area..Vessels Involved in the Freedom of Navigation Operation .The PLAN vessels were involved in the fourth Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) and originated from the North Sea Fleet and included one "large destroyer," i.e., a cruiser, one destroyer, one frigate, and one resupply vessel. The flotilla consisted of the Renhai class cruiser/Type 055 "large destroyer," the CNS Lhasa; the Luyang III/Type 052D class destroyer, the CNS Kaifeng; the Jiangkai II class/Type 054A frigate, the CNS Yantai; and the Fuchi class/Type 903A resupply supply, the CNS Kekexilihu..The vessels, divided into pairs, began their mission on June 27th by sailing towards and through the Tsushima Strait. The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) detected the Kaifeng and the Yantai approximately 25 miles (40 kilometers) southeast of Cape Toi, Miyazaki Prefecture, sailing through the Osumi Strait. The statement confirmed that the JMSDF observed the vessels moving eastward into the Philippine Sea after transiting the strait on June 26th. The JMSDF dispatched the JS Oumi, a Mashu class resupply vessel, and one P-1 maritime surveillance aircraft to monitor the vessels. The Lhasa and the Kekexilihu were detected about 37 miles (60 kilometers) southwest of the Tsushima Strait near Nagasaki Prefecture, sailing northeastward. The JMSDF deployed the JS Amakusa, a Hiuchu class multi-purpose support ship, and a P-1 maritime surveillance aircraft to monitor the Lhasa and Kekexilihu..The JMSDF detected the Kaifeng and the Yantai again beginning on June 30th, moving southeastward about 19 miles (30 kilometers) south of the town of Matsumae, Hokkaido. The vessels moved east through the Tsugaru Strait and into the Pacific Ocean from June 30th to July 1st. The JMSDF sent one Hirashima class minesweeper, the JS Yakushima, one P-3C, and one P-1 maritime surveillance aircraft to monitor the PLAN vessels. On July 1st, the JMSDF observed the Lhasa and the Kekexilihu sailing about 25 miles (40 kilometers) west of Rebun Island off the coast of Hokkaido, then sailing northeastward in the area. The JMSDF sent the JS Kumataka, a Hayabusa class missile boat, and a P-3C maritime surveillance aircraft to monitor the PLAN ships as they moved through the strait and into the Pacific Ocean. There are also indications that a nuclear attack submarine, likely a Type 093/Shang class nuclear powered attack submarine, also accompanied the flotilla..Previous Freedom of Navigation Operations .PLAN flotillas have previously conducted FONOPs in the Bering Sea three times, beginning in September 2021. The flotilla was made of the Renhai class cruiser, the CNS Nanchang, the Luyang III class destroyer, the CNS Guiyang, a Fuchi class resupply ship, and a Dongdiao II/Type 815A intelligence collection vessel, the CNS Venus. The four vessels entered the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around the Aleutian Islands. The USCGCs Berthof and Kimball intercepted and monitored the vessels as they entered and exited the area..The second FONOP occurred in September 2022, when the Rehnai class cruiser, the CNS Nanchang, the Jiangkai II class frigate, the CNS Yancheng, a Type 903A resupply ship, and the Dongpinghu, along with five Russian naval vessels, sailed into the Bering Sea. The formation sailed into the EEZ and patrolled the Bering Strait after China and Russia completed the Vostok 2022 joint military exercise. The USCGC Kimball intercepted and monitored the Chinese-Russian flotilla as it sailed through and out of the EEZ..In August 2023, another joint PLAN-Russian navy flotilla that consisted of 11 vessels conducted a FONOP after conducting the Northern Interaction 2023 joint naval exercise. The PLAN contingent consisted of two Luyang III class destroyers, the CNS Guiyang and CNS Qiqihar; two Jiangkai II class frigates, the CNS Rizhao and CNS Zaozhuang; and one Fuchi class resupply vessel, the CNS Taihu. The Russian contingent included two destroyers, two frigates, and one resupply ship that operated with the PLAN vessels. The flotilla sailed into the Bering Sea and patrolled the area before leaving through the Aleutian Islands. The US Navy (USN) deployed four Arleigh Burke class destroyers and a P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft to intercept and observe the formation as it sailed in the Bering Strait..Analysis.The FONOPs indicate that China will increasingly use them as a 'tit for tat' measure against the United States for the FONOPs the USN conducts in the Taiwan Strait and East and South China Seas. China also uses the operations to enable the PLAN to become more comfortable with blue water operations in various maritime environments. The operation allows China to push back against the United States' FONOPs in areas that it views as legitimate Chinese territory. For example, the USN vessels and aircraft would tell their Chinese counterparts that they are in international waters and that international law allows them to operate in that area during communications. In response, China would send aircraft and ships to intercept and monitor the American counterparts as they conducted the operations..China, however, views the operations as extremely provocative, especially in the South China Sea (SCS) and Taiwan Strait because of the US military aircraft and vessels used in the missions. The country also interprets the operations as breaking Chinese laws, but more importantly, as limited under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China's argument to dispute the legality of US FONOPs are based on Article 25 and the innocent passage concept. China bases its argument on the notion that Article 25 gives coastal states the right to regulate innocent passage using the country's domestic laws. China points out that the convention allows the country to determine what is considered innocent passage through territorial waters..China's argument using UNCLOS to dispute the United States' FONOPs is hypocritical because of the double standards that the country employs in the SCS. The country released statements that say the 2016 UNCLOS Arbitral Decision is illegal and took the position of "non-acceptance, non-participation, and non-recognition" regarding the convention. China bases its SCS argument on four parts that are found in UNCLOS. Firstly, China shares the same rights as archipelagic states and draws baselines around the features that allow it to claim the area as internal waters. Secondly, China claims that each SCS feature it occupies has a 12-nautical-mile (22-kilometer) territorial water line. China claims a 200-nautical-mile (371-kilometer) EEZ that begins where the territorial waters end. The last point is that China's SCS claims are based on historical claims it has to most of the SCS..However, China's argument is flawed because it does not have any basis under international law and norms. The country is not considered one of the 22 archipelagic states defined by the UN because the Chinese features are manmade and cannot naturally support a population. The argument involving the 12-nautical-mile territorial water boundary lacks merit because it is not recognized under UNCLOS. This point in China's argument is also flawed because the convention allows all foreign vessels, regardless of type, free passage through other states' territorial waters. The convention also specifies that vessels are not obligated to follow the domestic laws of the state through which they are passing through. China's argument involving the 200-nautical-mile EZZ point is flawed because its interpretation lacks basis under international law. The argument is also flawed because UNCLOS states that it only covers economic activity rather than military activity. The historical claims aspect of China's argument lacks the most merit because of the vague meaning of historical claims and the lack of legal basis under UNCLOS..The FONOPs allow the PLAN to increase its capability to conduct long range blue water operations in different environments. The September 2021 and July 2024 missions can be viewed as the PLAN attempting to conduct their own FONOPs in the Bering Sea. The first FONOP the PLAN conducted in September 2021 consisted of surface warfare, logistical resupply, and intelligence collection vessels. The various vessels allowed the PLAN to gain experience in how each vessel handled the environment in the Bering Sea and gain insight into how effectively they would operate when sailing through the region..China would be interested in how each type of vessel coped with sailing in the Bering Sea to plan for future operations in the Arctic. Furthermore, the FONOPs allow the PLAN to gain experience over time, so the crews and officers will become proficient in conducting blue water operations in other areas, such as the eastern Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. However, the PLAN likely determined it required assistance to gain the necessary experience to conduct FONOPs in the Bering Sea, which is why the second and third FONOPs involved similar vessels from the Russian Navy. The September 2022 and August 2023 FONOPs allowed the PLAN to gain insight into how the Russian Navy operated in the Bering Sea and contest the FONOPs conducted by the United States..The July 2024 mission is an evolution of the three previous missions because it showed that the PLAN can conduct similar FONOPs as the United States. The PLAN ordered the vessels to conduct the FONOP as a response to the NATO Summit held in Washington, D.C., which would explain why the Kaifeng and the Yantai reversed course and sailed around western Japan. The vessels then conducted the semi-circumnavigation of Japan before meeting with the Lhasa and the Kekexilihu near Hokkaido. Furthermore, the flotilla involved in the July 2024 FONOP consisted of similar vessels found in the flotillas that the PLAN deploys to the Indo-Pacific region..The flotilla's composition also indicates that the PLAN is now becoming more proficient at conducting FONOPs in the Bering Sea. This increased proficiency would translate to the PLAN conducting blue water operations in other areas, such as the eastern Pacific and the Atlantic Ocean. The flotilla's communication that they were conducting "freedom of navigation operations" with the USCGC Kimball further illustrated this point. The vessels saying they are conducting a FONOP in the United States' EEZ allowed China to show that it is learning how to conduct similar naval operations as the United States.